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Abstract. A theory of many-sorted implicative conceptual systems (ab-
breviated msic-systems) is outlined. Examples of msic-systems include
legal systems, normative systems, systems of rules and instructions, and
systems expressing policies and various kinds of scientic theories. In
computer science, msic-systems can be used in, for instance, legal in-
formation systems, decision support systems, and multi-agent systems.
In this essay, msic-systems are approached from a logical and algebraic
perspective aiming at clarifying their structure and developing e¤ective
methods for representing them. Of special interest are the most narrow
links or joinings between di¤erent strata in a system, that is between
subsystems of di¤erent sorts of concepts, and the intermediate concepts
intervening between such strata. Special emphasis is put on normative
systems, and the role that intermediate concepts play in such systems,
with an eye on knowledge representation issues. In this essay, norma-
tive concepts are constructed out of descriptive concepts using operators
based on the Kanger-Lindahl theory of normative positions. An abstract
architecture for a norm-regulated multi-agent system is suggested, con-
taining a scheme for how normative positions will restrict the set of
actions that the agents are permitted to choose from.
Key-words: Concept formation, Intermediary, Intermediate concept, Le-
gal concept, Normative system, Normative position, Norm-regulated sys-
tem, Agent architecture.
1 Introduction
1.1 Conceptual systems in computer- and systems sciences
In the famous Schilpp-volume where established scholars discuss Einsteins work
in physics and philosophy, Einstein, in his reply to criticisms, states the following
about the relationship between epistemology and science:
The reciprocal relationship of epistemology and science is of notewor-
thy kind. They are dependent upon each other. Epistemology without
contact with science becomes an empty scheme. Science without episte-
mology is insofar it is thinkable at all primitive and muddled. How-
ever, no sooner has the epistemologist, who is seeking a clear system,
fought his way through to such a system, than he is inclined to interpret
the thought-content of science in the sense of his system and to reject
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2whatever does not t into his system. The scientist, however, cannot
a¤ord to carry his striving for epistemological systematic that far. He
accepts gratefully the epistemological conceptual analysis; but the ex-
ternal conditions, which are set for him by the facts of experience, do
not permit him to let himself be too much restricted in the construction
of his conceptual world by the adherence to an epistemological system.
He therefore must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of
unscrupulous opportunist ... (Einstein, 1949.)
The science Einstein has in mind is primarily physics, but even for sciences
that are rather unlike physics its reciprocal relationship to epistemology is of a
noteworthy kind. The external conditions that, according to Einstein, restrict
the adherence to an epistemological system is the facts of experience, with
what Einstein probably meant the results of observations and experiments. But
for the sciences that are rather unlike physics the facts of experience may
better be characterized in some other way. For computer- and systems sciences,
the facts of experiencemay perhaps be described as useful applications.
Every science ought to critically question its foundational assumptions. How
urgent the researchers in a eld experience these foundational questions may
vary greatly from time to time. But probably all sciences go through stages when
the need for revisions and elaborations of the basic principles and fundamental
conceptions seem inevitable. In a young science, the foundational problems are
important and at the same time not seldom overlooked, since researchers working
in the eld are so enthusiastic over the ow of new results. In such situations,
philosophy (which includes epistemology as one of its sub-disciplines) may have
a role to play to make clear and sometimes even to remedy weak points in
the base of the new discipline. In this essay, some problems in the foundations
of computer- and systems sciences are addressed and theories and tools which
could be useful in the further development of some aspects of this discipline are
outlined.1
Concepts are a fundamental tool for all kinds of human communication and
concept formation is an important process in all branches of science. Information
science is of course not an exception. An information system is, when all technical
embeddings have been stripped o¤, a set of concepts and relations between
these concepts. The skeleton of an information system is a conceptual structure,
and this structure must have a solid formal representation, otherwise it cannot
function in a computer context.
The formal representations of conceptual systems has a long history in phi-
losophy and in several scientic disciplines. This essay is focused on the relation
between layers or strata of concepts of di¤erent sorts in a conceptual system and
on intermediate concepts that function as links between di¤erent strata. This
study is brought about using algebraic tools, which implies that the representa-
tion is algebraic in character. The result is a theory of many-sorted implicative
conceptual systems, msic-systems.
1 This essay is a revised version of Odelstad (2008b).
3I argue for an anti-nivelistic approach to theoretical systems, which implies
the recognition of the multitude of layers or strata that usually are parts of
such systems.2 As a consequence, I also argue for an anti-nivelistic approach to
knowledge representation. The following sketch is very vague and metaphorical,
however, my message is more adequately found in the formalism below. Suppose
that an msic-systemM represents knowledge or information of a domain D. The
implicative relation between concepts represents knowledge of some kind and the
kind of knowledge it represents may di¤er in di¤erent parts of the system. In
some parts of the system, it may represent conceptual knowledge, the knowledge
of denitions of concepts and the logical relations between concepts. In other
parts of the system, it may represent for example empirical knowledge about
some kind of phenomena and in yet another part of the system it may represent
empirical knowledge of another kind. Di¤erent strata of concepts of di¤erent
sorts may thus express knowledge of di¤erent kinds. The knowledge represented
by links between di¤erent strata often represent knowledge of a kind still di¤erent
from the knowledge represented by the strata, for example knowledge of rational
actions or appropriate rules. The revision of an msic-system can be done very
partially. In many cases, the necessary revision is e¤ected by the modication of
the narrowest links between some strata of di¤erent kinds.
It is often argued that, for example, rule-based expert systems cannot be
modied by the expert system itself. The following quotation from a text book
may illustrate this idea:
Knowledge in a rule-based expert system is represented by IF-THEN
production rules collected by observing or interviewing human experts.
This task, called knowledge acquisition, is di¢ cult and expensive. In
addition, once the rules are stored in the knowledge base, they cannot be
modied by the expert system itself. Expert systems cannot learn from
experience or adapt to new environments. Only a human can manually
modify the knowledge base by adding, changing or deleting some rules.
(Negnevitsky, 2005, p. 261.)
One of the advantages with the anti-nivelistic approach to knowledge repre-
sentation expressed by msic-systems is, as I see it, that this may not be true.
This is discussed in connection with forest cleaning below.
1.2 Stratication of concepts in theoretical systems
In an article from 1936, Albert Einstein discusses, among other things, the strat-
ication of the scientic system. According to Einstein, there is a multitude of
di¤erent layers or strata of concepts in science, where higher layers are more ab-
stract than lower layers. As regards to the nal aim of science, Einstein suggests,
intermediary layers are only of temporal nature and must eventually disappear
2 Nivelistic is constructed out of the French verb niveler, meaning Mettre au même
niveau, rendre égal".
4as irrelevant. But in the science of today, these strata represent partial success,
though problematic. (See Einstein, 1973, p. 295.)
Many theoretical systems show the same kind of phenomena as theoretical
physics in the following respects: In the system there is a hierarchical ordering
of the concepts in di¤erent strata and the status of the concepts in intermediate
strata is not obvious. In theoretical physics, the ordering of the layers is based on
degrees of abstraction. In other contexts, the stratication of the system can be
grounded on quite di¤erent principles, for example: descriptive versus normative,
state versus action or physical versus mental. One of the main issues to be
examined in this essay is the stratication of concepts in theoretical systems,
especially the connections between di¤erent strata and the function and status
of intermediate layers.
The kind of theoretical systems that will come into focus in this study can,
in a fairly general way, be characterized as conceptual systems and two essential
characteristics of these systems are the following: They have an implicative form
and they are many-sorted, i.e. a system consists of di¤erent sorts of concepts
(at least two). They are thus many-sorted implicative conceptual systems, in
the sequel abbreviated msic-systems. Di¤erent kinds of systems belong to the
class under study, for example legal systems, normative systems, systems of
rules and instructions, systems expressing policies and some varieties of scientic
theories. Such systems have an important role to play in the discipline articial
intelligence, which has as one of its aims to bring forth smart behaviour of
computers.
In the investigation reported here, msic-systems are studied from a logical
and algebraic perspective aiming at clarifying their structure and developing
e¤ective methods for representing them. Special emphasis is put on the most
narrow links between subsystems of di¤erent sorts in a system and interme-
diaries (intermediate concepts) mediating or intervening between subsystems of
di¤erent sorts. Such links and intermediaries are of great interest when there are
reasons for changing the system.
In computer science, msic-systems can be useful in many problem areas,
for example: legal information systems, computer security, knowledge represen-
tation, expert systems, architectures for multiagent-systems, decision-analytic
support systems and agent-based simulations. This study of msic-systems is
mainly a contribution to the tradition of constructing intelligible and explicit
models and representations in contrast to case-based, connectivist and emergent
approaches (cf. Luger, 2002, p. 228). But msic-systems also prepare the grounds
for the use of machine learning, where the links and intermediaries between
subsystems will play an important role.
1.3 The theory of msic-systems
When developing a theory of msic-systems, it is important to note that di¤erent
parts of the theory are situated on di¤erent levels of abstraction, and as a conse-
quence there are di¤erent levels of applications of the theory. The word theory
5has several meanings and in this context it is important to distinguish between
the following two meanings:
(1) Theory in the sense often used in logic; abstract theory, theory in contrast
to model (in the model-theoretic sense)
(2) Theory in contrast to practice and application.
Here a theory of msic-systems is put forward in both senses of theory. The the-
ory of msic-systems, where theoryis taken in the second sense contains some
theories of msic-systems in the rst sense, of formal theories. The formal theories
of msic-systems are characterized axiomatically as algebraic theories and among
the models of these abstract (formal) theories are specic msic-systems. The ab-
stract theories of msic-systems express the structure of such systems. The theory
of msic-systems, in the second sense, contains other theoretical perspectives than
the abstract, formal ones.
The theory of msic-systems will be abbreviated msic-theory, where theory
stands for sense (2). A formal, abstract theory of msic-systems where theory
is taken in sense (1) will be called a structural msic-theory, since such a theory
characterizes the structure of msic-systems. Such abstract theories will usually
be presented as axiomatized theories within set theory. The most abstract part
of the msic-theory will be framed as a number of set-theoretical predicates.
2 Normative systems
2.1 What is a norm?
The theory of msic-systems has many applications and there are many di¤er-
ent kinds of msic-systems. In this essay I will focus on the representations of
normative systems as msic-systems. I take a rst step in the analysis of norms
in this section, and a great deal of simplication is needed. Modications and
elaborations of this oversimplied picture will be developed step by step in later
sections.
Norms, normative sentences, are understood in contrast to descriptive sen-
tences. Sentences of the latter kind express matters of fact but are not used for
expressing evaluations or value judgments. A normative sentence, on the other
hand, does not state what is the case but what shall be the case or what may
be the case, or will have an evaluating function.
Let us preliminarily say that there are two kinds of normative sentences,
viz. categorically normative sentences and conditional normative sentences. A
categorically normative sentence consists of a descriptive sentence preceded by
a norm creating operator, for example it shall be the case thator it may be
the case that. If q is a descriptive sentence then it shall be the case that q,
which is abbreviated Shall(q) and it may be the case that q, abbreviated as
May(q), are examples of categorically normative sentences. A conditional norm
is an if-then sentence (an implication) where the antecedent is descriptive and
the consequent is purely normative. Hence, a conditional norm has the form
6p! B(q)
where p and q are descriptive sentences and B is a norm-creating operator,
for example Shall or May. As suggested above, it is possible to extend ordi-
nary propositional logic with propositional operators as Shall and May, etc. The
branch of logic derived in this way is called deontic logic. Deonticcomes from
the Greek word deont, which means that which is binding. Expressed in a
very general way, deontic logic is the logical study of obligation and permission.
The modern study of this kind of logic is often said to have commenced with
the article Deontic Logicby the Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright
published in Mind in 1951.3 This theory was anticipated by Ernst Mally in the
1920s and, much earlier, by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and Jeremy
Bentham (1748-1832). The core of standard deontic logic is the formal study of
the deontic operators it is permissible that (May) and it is obligatory that
(Shall) and we can extend predicate logic as well as propositional logic with
these operators.
2.2 Norms in predicate logic and as ordered pairs
A conditional norm is (usually) expressed as a universal sentence. For example:
(n1) For any x; y and z : if x has promised to pay $y to z, then x has an
obligation to pay $y to z:
Within predicate logic, we can formalize (n1) as follows:
(n2) 8x; y; z : PromisedPay(x; y; z)! Obligation_to_Pay(x; y; z)
Thus, a typical conditional norm is a universal implication. Syntactically it con-
sists of three parts: the sequence of universal quantiers, the antecedent formula
and the consequent formula. Note that the norm (n2) correlates open sentences:
PromisedPay(x; y; z) is correlated to Obligation_to_Pay(x; y; z). A norm like
(n2) can therefore be represented as a relational statement correlating a ground,
PromisedPay, to a consequence, Obligation_to_Pay:
PromisedPay R Obligation_to_Pay.
Generally, pRq represents the norm
(n3) 8x1; :::; x : p(x1; :::; x)! q(x1; :::; x)
given that p and q are -ary predicates. It is important here that the free vari-
ables in p(x1; :::; x) are the same and in the same order as the free variables in
q(x1; :::; x): R is a binary relation, and pRq is a relational statement equivalent
to hp; qi 2 R. Thus, a norm can be represented as pRq or hp; qi 2 R. If, in the
3 The development of deontic logic is closely related to another, better known part of
logic, namely modal logic. The core of modal logic is the formal study of the operators
it is possible thatand it is necessary that(the so-called alethic modalities) and
modal propositional logic is propositional logic extended with the possibility- and
necessity-operator.
7actual context, R can be tacitly understood and therefore omitted, it is only a
small step to the representation of (n3) as the ordered pair hp; qi.
Note that pRq as a representation of (n3) does not generally presuppose that
q is a normative (or deontic) predicate, so pRq can be used as a representation
of any sentence which has the same form as (n3). Therefore, in many contexts
of application the implicative relation R can be such that only some of the
sentences pRq are norms. For reasons that will be explained when the formal
framework is discussed, pRq will be abbreviated as the ordered pair hp; qi only
when p and q are conditions of di¤erent sorts.
In the above discussion of the representation of norms, p and q, as well
as PromisedPay and Obligation_to_Pay, appear as predicates. But the term
predicate is often used for syntactical entities, and, therefore, interpreting pRq;
p and q will here instead be conceived of as conditions. If p is a -ary condition
and i1,...,i are individuals, then p(i1; :::; i) is a statement. Antecedents and
consequences of norms are represented as conditions and are called grounds and
consequences respectively. A norm is represented as a statement relating (or cor-
relating) a ground to a consequence, or represented as an ordered pair consisting
of a ground and a consequence. In the preliminary analysis put forward in this
section, grounds are descriptive and consequences are normative conditions.4
Note that Obligation_to_Pay is a normative condition but that the sentence
Obligation_to_Pay(x; y; z) can be analysed as
Obligatory Pay(x; y; z).
where Obligatory is a deontic operator resulting in a new predicate when it is
applied to a given predicate. Pay is a descriptive condition and by applying the
deontic operator Obligatory we can in a sense construct a normative condition
Obligatory Pay out of the descriptive condition Pay. It is presupposed here
that Obligatory Payis equivalent to Obligation_to_Pay and I will return
to this way of constructing normative conditions out of descriptive conditions
using deontic operators.
Within the framework of the above preliminary analysis of norms, we can
view a normative system N as consisting of a system B1 of potential grounds
(descriptive conditions) and a system B2 of potential consequences (normative
conditions). The set of norms in N are the set J of links or joinings from
B1 to B2. The Figure 1.1 is an attempt to illustrate the situation, where a
norm is represented by an arrow from the system of grounds to the system of
consequences.
A norm in a normative system N , the norm here represented as an ordered
pair hp; qi, can be regarded as a mechanism of inference. We can distinguish two
cases. Suppose that p and s are descriptive conditions and q and t normative.








Fig. 1. A simple normative system.
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In (1), hp; qi functions as a deductive mechanism correlating sentences by
means of instantiation, while in (2), hp; qi plays an important role in correlating
one condition, s, to another condition, t.6
A condition, as the term is used here, is very similar to a relation; in a sense
a condition is used for expressing a relation.7 Relations, and therefore also
conditions, are a specic kind of concepts. A normative system is thus a system
consisting of an implicative relation between concepts. Note that the kind of
normative systems we have encountered so far consists of two sorts of concepts,
descriptive and normative.
5 Note that sRp relates conditions of the same sort and the same holds for qRt; s
and p are descriptive but q and t are normative. A norm consists of conditions of
di¤erent sorts. As stated earlier, only implicative sentences that relate conditions of
di¤erent sorts will be represented as ordered pairs.
6 See Lindahl & Odelstad (2004) subsection 3.2 and Odelstad & Boman (2004) sub-
section 2.2. Cf. Alchourrón & Bulygin (1971) p. 28. Schema 1 corresponds to what
Alchourrón and Bulygin call the correlation of individual cases to individual solu-
tions, and schema 2 corresponds to what they call the correlation of generic cases to
generic solutions.
7 Properties are here regarded as unary relations and can be expressedby conditions.
9Easily observable, conjunctions, disjunctions and negations of conditions can
be formed by the operations ^;_;0 ; namely in the following way (where x1; :::; x
are place-holders, not individual constants).
(p ^ q)(x1; :::; x) if and only if p(x1; :::; x) and q(x1; :::; x).
(p _ q)(x1; :::; x) if and only if p(x1; :::; x) or q(x1; :::; x).
(p0)(x1; :::; x) if and only if not p(x1; :::; x).
? (Falsum) is the empty condition, not fullled by any  tuple, and > (Verum)
is the universal condition, fullled by all  tuples.
As is well-known, the truth-functional connectives can be used as operations
in Boolean algebras. It is therefore possible to construct Boolean algebras of
conditions. The role of the set of norms is to join two Boolean algebras:
 a Boolean algebra of grounds,
 a Boolean algebra of consequences.
The norms are links or joinings between the algebra of grounds and the algebra
of consequences.
The outline of the algebraic approach to normative systems just presented is
substantially simplied. The approach will be developed extensively below.
3 Conceptual systems
In the previous subsection, a simple normative system has been characterized
as a two-sorted implicative conceptual system, where the concepts are, from a
logical point of view, relations (expressed as conditions) and the two sorts of
concepts involved are descriptive and normative conditions. However, relations
(and therefore also conditions) are only one specic kind of concepts, where kind
is something else than sort. Other kinds of concepts are, inter alia, aspects
(in philosophy of science often called attributes) and measures (often termed
scales). Examples of aspects are length, weight, temperature, intelligence, utility
and probability. Examples of measures are meter, kilogram, degrees centigrade
and the probability measure. Di¤erent kinds of concepts have di¤erent logical
form (for example relations, structures and functions) while di¤erent sorts of
concepts di¤er in their cognitive status (for example descriptive and normative
respectively). From a logical point of view, aspects are structures and measures
are functions.
When studying implicative conceptual systems where the concepts are condi-
tions, the implicative relation is implication in a straightforward sense. However,
when the concepts are aspects or scales, we are dealing with implicative relations
that are implications only in a rather generalized sense. Implicative statements,
i.e. statements expressing that an implicative relation holds, can in such cases,
for example, be interpreted as determination or relevance. However, we will even
in the generalized contexts talk about the antecedent and consequent of an im-
plicative statement, and even of grounds and consequences.
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As pointed out above, for concepts which are conditions we can in an obvious
way dene the operations conjunction, disjunction and negation and thereby
arrive at a Boolean algebra. The situation is di¤erent for concepts that are
aspects, since taking the negation of an aspect is not certainly a meaningful
operation. However, aspects can form a lattice. We shall discuss this further
below.
Conceptis a complicated notion and is of great importance in many areas.
It is tightly connected to the notion of meaning, and the meaning of con-
ceptsis a philosophical mineeld. But in this context, it is impossible to avoid
the term concept. The following short passage from the entry Concept in The
Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes its usefulness:
Concept is one of the oldest terms in the philosophical vocabulary, and
one of the most equivocal. Though a frequent source of confusion and
controversy, it remains useful, precisely because of its ambiguity, as a sort
of passkey through the labyrinths represented by the theory of meaning,
the theory of thinking, and the theory of being. (Heath, 1967.)
In the theory of msic-systems, the use of the notions conceptand meaningis
instrumental, and these notions function as passkeys to the main objectives of
the work presented here. As the word conceptis used, complex combinations
of concepts are still regarded as concepts. A concept can be dened in terms of
other concepts in a more or less complicated way.
A notion connected to conceptthat will play a role here is cognitive status.
The idea is that the di¤erent sorts of concepts constituting an msic-system are
often di¤erent with respect to their cognitive status. As a source of inspiration
for using the notion cognitive status in the theory of msic-systems one can
take Ernest Nagels discussion of the cognitive status of scientic theories in his
book The Structure of Science. But here the term cognitive statusis applied to
concepts. Examples of di¤erent cognitive status include: logical, empirical, ob-
servational, operational, theoretical, physical, mental, descriptive, prescriptive,
normative, evaluative, and as we will see below intermediate. (Note that sev-
eral of the di¤erent sorts of cognitive status exemplied above can be applied to
the same concepts.)
4 Intermediate concepts form and function
4.1 Intermediaries
In the simplied presentation above, a normative system is represented as a two-
sorted implicative conceptual system, consisting of a set of descriptive grounds
and a set of normative consequences. However, many concepts for example in
law are neither purely descriptive nor purely normative. Like Janus, the Roman
god of beginnings and endings, they have two faces, one turned towards facts






Fig. 2. A normative system with intermediaries.
to be intermediate between facts and legal consequences and will often be called
intermediaries. Figure 1.2 will give a rst illustration of this idea.
As an example, consider what it means to be a citizen according to the system
of the U.S. Constitution. Article XIV, section 1 reads as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
the due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Two key concepts in the article are citizen and person. The article species
the ground for the condition being a citizen in the United States:
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof
and species a number of regal consequences of this condition expressed in terms
of shall:
no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.
The article does not state any ground for the condition to be a person but
species a number of legal consequences connected to this condition:
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
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Within the constitutional system of United States, this article is supple-
mented with rules laid down by the Constitution and through court decisions.
These rules determine together, by specifying grounds and consequences, the
role the concept citizenand personhave within the legal system.
Let us construct a simplied condition-implicative representation of the
legal rules described above.8 According to the rules, the disjunction of the two
conditions
b: to be a person born in the U.S.
n: to be a person naturalized in the U.S.
in conjunction with the condition
s: to be a person subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.
implies the condition
c: to be a citizen of the U.S.
That this implicative relationship holds according to the system is repre-
sented in the form ((b_ n)^ s)Rc. Since it is a settled matter that citizens who
are minors do not have the right to vote in general elections, c does not imply
the condition
e: to be entitled to vote in general elections.
Therefore: not [cRe], and hence not [((b _ n) ^ s)Re].
Let
a: to be adult.
Simplifying matters, suppose that,
(1) (c ^ a)Re:
It is easy to see that this is equivalent to
(2) cR(a0 _ e):
Going from (1) to (2) can be called exportation, and going from (2) to (1)
importation.
We thus have within the system the following rules: ((b _ n) ^ s)Rc and
cR(a0_e), stating that the condition ((b_n)^s) is a ground for c and (a0_e) is
a consequence of c. These two rules determine partly the role of c (citizenship)
in the constitutional system under study. But there can also be other grounds
g1; g2; ::: for c and consequences h1; h2; ::: of c within the constitutional system.
Suppose that g1; g2; ::: are the grounds of c and h1; h2; ::: the consequences of c.
Hence, the role of c in the system is characterized by
g1Rc; g2Rc; :::; cRh1; cRh2; :::
The concept c thus couples a set of legal consequences to a set of legal grounds
and c is situated intermediatebetween the set of grounds and the set of conse-
quences. Concepts of this kind are called intermediate concepts or intermediaries.
Over the past sixty years, there has been an on-going discussion in Scandinavia
as regards the idea of intermediate concepts in the law. The debate was started
8 The concept citizen regarded as an intermediary is discussed in Odelstad & Lindahl
(1998), Odelstad & Lindahl (2000) and Lindahl & Odelstad (2000). In Lindahl &
Odelstad (2003), citizenship is treated from the point of view of organic wholes.
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in 1944-1945 by Anders Wedberg and Per-Olof Ekelöf, and in 1951 Alf Ross pub-
lished his well-known essay on Tû-Tû.9 In this debate, an often used example
is the concept of ownership. Ross represents a set of legal rules concerning own-
ership (denoted O) in essentially the following way, where Fi expresses a possible












Ross himself comments on this scheme in the following way:
O(ownership) merely stands for the systematic connection that F1
as well as F2, F3,...,Fp entail the totality of legal consequences C1, C2,
C3,..,Cn. As a technique of presentation this is expressed then by stating
in one series of rules the facts that create ownership and in another
series the legal consequences that ownershipentails. (Ross 1956-57, p.
820.)
Note that the rules that create ownership can be expressed by one rule:
F1_:::_Fp  ! O.10 And the rules describing what ownershipentail can also be
condensed to one rule: O  ! C1 ^ :::^Cn. So an equivalent way of representing
the legal rules concerning ownership according to Ross is the following scheme:
F1 _ ::: _ Fp  ! O  ! C1 ^ ::: ^ Cn
Whereas F1; :::; Fp can be called grounds and C1; :::; Cn consequences of O,
F1 _ ::: _ Fp is the ground of O and C1 ^ ::: ^ Cn the consequence of O.
Note that the rule Fi ! O is a way of introducing O into the discourse,
and appropriately we can call such a rule an introduction rule of O. In harmony
with this, the rule O  ! Cj can be called an elimination rule of O, since in a
sense such a rule can eliminate O from the discourse. Analogous to the use of
the phrases the groundand the consequencewe can say that
F1 _ ::: _ Fp  ! O
is the introduction rule of O and
O  ! C1 ^ ::: ^ Cn
9 For a more detailed analysis of the early Scandinavian debate see Lindahl & Odelstad
(1999a) section 1.2.
10  ! is a consequence relation.
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is the elimination rule of O.11
In Wedberg (1951), three di¤erent methods for treating the concept of own-
ershipare discussed. The rst and second of these methods aim at a denition
of ownership in terms of grounds and consequences respectively. Wedbergs third
method treats ownership as a vehicle of inference. According to Wedberg this
means that ownership is a tool for inferring statements of legal consequences
from statements of legal facts, and, therefore, ownership is undened. Obviously,
Wedbergs third method for treating ownership is close to Rosss view.
We will return to the question of dening intermediate concepts in relation
to regarding them as vehicles of inferences. As a point of departure for further
discussions and renements, we regard intermediate concepts as characterized by
their grounds and consequences. The characterization of the concept citizenship,
c; thus has the following form:
g1Rc; g2Rc; :::; cRh1; cRh2; :::
For the view of intermediate concepts adopted in this essay, the discussion
in legal philosophy has been an important source of inspiration. But there are
of course also other theories that have inuenced this research. The following
quotation from Lindahl & Odelstad (1999a) emphasizes this, where the ideas
mentioned aboveare the ideas of Wedberg and Ross.
In the theory of language of Michael Dummett, there are features with
some resemblance to the ideas mentioned above. According to Dummett,
the meaning of an expression is determined, on one hand by the condition
for correctly uttering it, and on the other hand by what the uttering
of the expression commits the speaker to. Therefore, the meaning of a
statement is identied in part by the conditions from which it can be
inferred and in part by what can be inferred from the statement. In the
case of utterances of sentences composed by the connectives and, or
etc., this is given by what are called introduction and elimination rules
in Gentzens system of natural deduction. (Lindahl & Odelstad, 1999a,
p. 165.)
Introduction and elimination rules are discussed further in Lindahl & Odelstad
(2008a).
The analysis of the concept of intermediaryinvolves complicated questions
of meaning and is therefore a philosophically loaded topic. The formal theory of
intervenients which is presented in Lindahl & Odelstad (2008a) and (2008b) is
intended as a means for a thorough analysis of the concept of an intermediary.
An interesting issue in the discussion of intermediaries is the negation of
an intermediate concept. Suppose that a1 is the ground of the intermediary m
and that a2 is the consequence of m. Let m0 be the negation of m, i.e. not-m.
Is m0 an intermediate concept? If the answer is yes, what can be said about
11 Introduction and elimination rules are discussed in Lindahl & Odelstad (2008a) with
reference to Gentzen.
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its grounds and consequences? This question, which is discussed in Lindahl &
Odelstad (2008a), is complicated, especially if we turn to open intermediaries.
4.2 Open intermediaries
The concept work of equal valueis an essential concept in the Swedish Equal
Opportunities Act. The following quotation demonstrates this (emphasis added
here):
Employers and employees shall cooperate in pursuing active e¤orts to
promote equality in working life. They shall strive in particular to prevent
and eliminate di¤erences in pay and in other conditions of employment
between women and men performing work that may be considered equal
or of equal value. They shall also promote equal opportunities for wage
growth for women and men.
Work is to be considered equal in value to other work if, based on
an overall assessment of the nature of the work and the requirements
imposed on the worker, it may be deemed to be of similar value. As-
sessments of work requirements shall take into account criteria such as
knowledge and skills, responsibility and e¤ort. When the nature of the
work is assessed, particular regard shall be taken of the working condi-
tions.
The concept work of equal valueis an intermediary with using the Janus-
metaphor one face looking at the nature of and requirements for the work and
the other face looking at e¤orts to promote equality in working life, especially
equal pay for equal work. The law does not supply us with a complete set of
introduction rules for the concept. Instead it mentions some criteria that equality
of value depends on, viz. knowledge and skills, responsibility and e¤ort. However,
one can extract the following uncontroversial introduction rule: if x and y are
work that requires the same degree of knowledge, skills, responsibility and e¤ort,
then x and y are work of equal value. We can express this in a formalised style
as follows:
x 1 y & x 2 y & x 3 y & x 4 y & x 5 y  ! x  y
where
1 is the relation equal knowledge
2 is the relation equal skills
3 is the relation equal responsibility
4 is the relation equal e¤ort
5 is the relation equal working conditions
v is the relation equal value
Note that the equality relations 1,2,3,4 and 5 are here regarded as con-
ditions and we can therefore apply Boolean operations on the equality relations,
for example construct conjunctions of them. One of the grounds of v is thus
the condition
16
1 ^ 2 ^ 3 ^ 4 ^ 5 :
But it is also possible that work x and y are of equal value even if they
are not equal with respect to the requirements knowledge, skills, responsibility,
e¤ort and working condition. We can imagine a situation such that x requires
more knowledge than y, and y more responsibility than x but that these two
di¤erences balance out. But to turn this observation into an introduction rule
is often not possible. The applicability of the concept work of equal value in a
certain case must therefore be based on judgments of what holds in the actual
case. And even if the law does not state detailed rules for these judgments it gives
guidelines, for example in terms of what are possible inputs in such judgments
or what factors or circumstances must be taken into account.
The grounds of the concept work of equal valueis thus only partially de-
termined by the law in the form of introduction rules. The application of the
concept in special cases deserves interpretative decisions based on the role and
function of the concept in the law. We call such intermediaries ground-open. Con-
cepts such that the consequences are only partially determined by elimination
rules are called consequence-open.
Open intermediaries are further discussed in Lindahl & Odelstad (2008a). For
a detailed discussion of the concept work of equal value, see Odelstad (2008a).
4.3 Intermediaries in normative systems
A normative system is only in rather special cases a two-sorted implicative con-
ceptual system, i.e. a system of grounds and a system of consequences. Instead,
normative systems often contain also many intermediate concepts. In more com-
plex normative systems, for example legal systems, there are usually more than
one system of intermediaries, and these systems often form a kind of network,
where between intermediaries of two di¤erent sorts there are intermediaries of a
third sort.12 Note that a rule can simultaneously be an introduction rule for one
concept and an elimination rule for another.
Intermediaries do not only exist in normative systems but in many other
msic-systems. This is discussed in Lindahl & Odelstad (1999a) p. 178.
4.4 A remark on related work
The Scandinavian discussion of intermediate concepts has had a crucial inuence
on the theory of msic-systems put forth in this essay. The following works have
been of special signicance: Wedberg (1951), Ross (1951), Halldén (1978) and
Lindahl (1985). Hedenius (1941) does not consider intermediate concepts but
Hedeniusdiscussion about spurious and genuine norms is of great interest in this
context. The works on introduction and elimination rules in logic and philosophy
12 In Lindahl & Odelstad (2008b), this is illustrated as Figure 1. There the lines between
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Fig. 3. Norm ha1;a2i is narrower than norm hb1;b2i.
of mathematics by Gentzen, Dummett and Prawitz have, as emphasized above,
also inuenced this work. (See Gentzen 1934, Dummett 1973 and Prawitz 1977).
There are similarities between Richard Hares prescriptivism and the view
of intermediaries developed in the work that Lindahl and I have conducted. In
Lindahl & Odelstad (1999a), there is a reference to Hare (1989), but the relation
between open intermediate concepts and prescriptivism ought to be investigated
in more detail.
I have been inuenced by P.W. Bridgmans operationalistic approach to con-
cept formation and it seems to me that operationalism and the ideas about
intermediate concepts t well together in roughly the following manner: If a
predicative concept is neither purely normative nor operationally denable, con-
sider if it is an intermediate concept. To develop this dictum in detail is not,
however, within the scope of the present essay.
5 Implicative closeness between strata
One important problem area in the study of msic-systems is the closeness
between di¤erent strata. Some of the ideas regarding this topic will be informally
described in this section.
Consider the norms (links) from the system B1 of grounds to the system B2
of consequences. One norm can be narrowerthan another, which is illustrated
in Figure 3.13 Suppose that ha1; a2i and hb1; b2i are norms from the system of
grounds B1 to the system of consequences B2.
Figure 3 illustrates that ha1; a2i is narrower than hb1; b2i. We can say alter-
natively that ha1; a2i lies between b1 and b2: We dene the relation at least
as narrow as, expressed by E; in the following way:
ha1; a2i E hb1; b2i if and only if b1Ra1 and a2Rb2.
13 See Lindahl & Odelstad (2003) p. 84.
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It is easy to see that if R is a quasi-ordering, i.e. transitive and reexive, then
E is also a quasi-ordering.
A norm that is maximally narrow is minimal with respect to the relation
at least as narrow as. Hence, a norm ha1; a2i is maximally narrow if there
is no norm in the system that is strictly narrower than ha1; a2i, i.e. if ha1; a2i
is a minimal element with respect to at least as narrow as. In a normative
system, the set of norms that are maximally narrow play a crucial role. Given
certain requirements of a well-formed normative system, all the other norms of
the system are determined by its maximally narrow norms and, therefore, any
change of such a system implies a change of at least one maximally narrow norm.
This is discussed in Odelstad & Lindahl (2002), Lindahl & Odelstad (2003) and
(2008a).
The idea behind intermediaries is that they are intermediate between di¤er-
ent strata of concepts and o¤er narrow links between the strata. It is important
to notice that the intermediaries between two strata constitute a stratum itself.
The introduction rules of the intermediaries are links from the bottom stratum
to the intermediate stratumand the elimination rules of the intermediaries are
links from the intermediate stratumto the top stratum. The introduction
rule and the elimination rule of an intermediary constitute narrow links, since
the introduction rule determines the weakest ground of the intermediary and the
elimination rule the strongest consequence. Intermediate concepts are thus stud-
ied in terms of how narrow they are the structure of grounds and the structure of
consequences. Generally, the implicative closenessbetween strata is analysed
using concepts as minimal joining, weakest ground and strongest consequence.
Figure 4 illustrates the two last mentioned notions: a1 is a weakest ground of m
if b1Rm implies a1Rb1. And a2 is a strongest consequence of m if mRb2 implies
a2Rb2. As a preliminary approximation we can say that the introduction rule
of an intermediary states its weakest ground and the elimination rule states its
strongest consequence. In Lindahl & Odelstad (2008b), this is discussed in more
detail and a rudimentary typology of intermediate concepts is established.
6 Deontic consequences
Let us for a moment return to the simple picture of a normative system consisting
of a system of grounds and a system of consequences. The consequences are
normative conditions. So far, what we have said about normative conditions is
just that they can be constructed by applying a deontic operation to descriptive
conditions. There is an extensive literature on deontic operations and it is not
intended to enter this discussion here. In this essay, the combination of deontic
and action logic developed by Stig Kanger will be used, especially the theory of
normative positions created by Kanger and Lindahl.
6.1 Deontic logic with the action operator Do
Kanger exploited the possibilities of combining the deontic operator Shall with









Fig. 4. m is an intermediate concept between B1 and B2 with weakest ground a1 and
strongest consequence a2.
that something is the case (see Kanger, 1957). To be more exact, Shall Do(x; q)
means that it shall be that x sees to it that q, while for example :Shall Do(y;:q)
means that it is not the case that it shall be that y sees to it that not q. The
combination of the deontic operator Shall with the action operator Do and the
negation operation : gives us a powerful language for expressing purely nor-
mative sentences. Kanger emphasized the possibilities of external and internal
negation of sentences where these operators are combined. Using combinations
of deontic and action operators, we can formulate norms in a more e¤ective way.
A conditional norm may for example have the following form: If p then it shall
be the case that x sees to it that q, which thus can be written as
p! Shall Do(x; q).
In such norms, p is often a state of a¤airs which is about x and y, while q is a
state of a¤air which deals with y, i.e. p can be seen as predicate with x and y as
variables while q is a predicate with y as the only variable. Hence, a conditional
norm can have the following form:
p(x; y)! Shall Do(x;:q(y)).
A concrete example of a norm which has this form is as follows. Suppose that
p(x; y) means that x owns y and y is a dog while q(y) means that y fouls public
places. The norm above then says that the owner of a dog shall see to it that
the dog does not foul in public places.
Note that the sentence May Do(x; q) can be dened in terms of the operators
Shall and Do in the following way:
May Do(x; q) if and only if :Shall :Do(x; q).
It is worth noting that conditional norms have some similarities with pro-
duction rules. According to Luger (2002) p. 171, a production rule is
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a condition-action pair and denes a single chunk of problem-solving
knowledge. The condition part of the rule is a pattern that determines
when that rule may be applied to a problem instance. The action part
denes the associated problem-solving step.
The antecedent (or ground) in a norm corresponds to the condition part in a
production rule, and the consequent (or consequence) in a norm corresponds to
the action part. A production rule thus has the logical form
p! Do q
or perhaps better
p! Shall Do q.
6.2 Normative positions
In 1913, the American jurist Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld published a work in phi-
losophy of law which has been very inuential. It carries the title Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and contains a character-
ization of eight fundamental legal notions, which were meant to serve as fun-
damental elements in the analysis of more complex legal relations. Inspired by
Hohfelds work, Kanger developed a theory of normative positions using the
deontic-action-language. Kangers theory of normative positions was originally
expressed as a theory of types of rights. He emphasized that the term righthas
various meanings. For example, if Mrs. x has lent 100 dollars to Mr. y, then x
has a right of the simple type Claim against y that she gets back the money she
has lent to y. Let
q1(x; y) : x gets back the money x has lent to y:
The type of right Claim with regard to q1(x; y) is dened in the following
way:
Claim(x; y; q1(x; y)) if and only if Shall Do(y; q1(x; y)).
This means that y shall see to it that x gets back the money she lent y. Further,
Mrs. x has probably a right of type Immunity to walk outside Mr. ys shop. Let
q2(x; y) : x walks outside ys shop
Immunity with regard to q2 is dened as follows:
Immunity(x; y; q2(x; y)) if and only if Shall :Do(y;:q2(x; y)).
Hence, it shall be the case that y does not see to it that x does not walk outside
ys shop. (These examples are taken from Lindahl, 1994, p. 891-892.)
Kangers work was considerably improved and extended into a formal theory
of normative positions in Lindahl (1977). Lindahl developed three systems of
types of normative positions. The simplest one is the system of one-agent types
of normative position, and only this system is used in this essay. The one-agent
types are constructed in the following way. Let  stand for either of  or ::
Starting from the scheme MayDo(x;q); where  stands for the two alter-
natives of a¢ rmation or negation, a list is made of all maximal and consistent
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conjunctions, maxiconjunctions, such that each conjunct satises the scheme.14
Maximality means that if we add any further conjunct, satisfying the scheme,
then this new conjunct either is inconsistent with the original conjunction or
redundant. Note that the expression :Do(x;q)& :Do(x;:q) expresses xs pas-
sivity with regard to q. Here this expression is abbreviated as Pass(x; q). By this
procedure, the following list of seven maxiconjunctions is obtained, which are
denoted T1(x; q),. . . ,T7(x; q), see Lindahl (1977), p. 92.
T1(x; q) : MayDo(x; q) & MayPass(x; q) & MayDo(x;:q):
T2(x; q) : MayDo(x; q) & MayPass(x; q) & :MayDo(x;:q):
T3(x; q) : MayDo(x; q) & :MayPass(x; q) & MayDo(x;:q):
T4(x; q) : :MayDo(x; q) & MayPass(x; q) & MayDo(x;:q):
T5(x; q) : MayDo(x; q) & :MayPass(x; q) & :MayDo(x;:q):
T6(x; q) : :MayDo(x; q) & MayPass(x; q) & :MayDo(x;:q):
T7(x; q) : :MayDo(x; q) & :MayPass(x; q) & MayDo(x;:q):
T1,. . . ,T7 are called the types of one-agent positions.15 Given the under-
lying logic, the one-agent types are mutually disjoint and their union is ex-
haustive. i.e. constitute a partition. Note that :MayDo (x; q) & : MayPass
(x; q) & :MayDo(x;:q) is logically false, according to the logic of Shall and
May.
It is easy to see that the last three types can more concisely be described as
follows:
T5(x; q) : Shall Do(x; q):
T6(x; q) : Shall Pass(x; q):
T7(x; q) : Shall Do(x;:q):
Note that the following symmetry principleshold (Lindahl, 1977, p. 92):
T1(x; q) if and only if T1(x;:q)
T2(x; q) if and only if T4(x;:q)
T3(x; q) if and only if T3(x;:q)
T5(x; q) if and only if T7(x;:q)
T6(x; q) if and only if T6(x;:q)
In Lindahl & Odelstad (2004) and Odelstad & Boman (2004) the one-agent-
types in the Kanger-Lindahl theory of normative positions are used as operators
on descriptive conditions to get deontic conditions. As a simple example, suppose
that r is a unary condition. Then Tir (with 1  i  7) is the binary condition
such that
Tir(y; x) i¤ Ti(x; r(y));
where Ti(x; r(y)) is the ith formula of one-agent normative positions. Note that
for example T3(x; r(y)) means
14 The notion of maxiconjunctionwas introduced in Makinson (1986), p. 405f.
15 Formally, a typeTi (1i7) of one-agent positions refers to the set of all ordered
pairs hx; qi such that Ti(x; q).
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MayDo(x; r(y)) & :MayPass(x; r(y)) & MayDo(x;:r(y)):
Ti is called a one-agent position-operator. If hp; Tiri is a norm, then from
p(x1; x2) we can, by using the norm, infer Tir(x1; x2) and thus also Ti(x2; r(x1)),
which means that, with regard to the state of a¤airs r(x1), x2 has a normative
position of type Ti:
The theory of normative positions was developed during the 60s and 70s,
primarily as an analytical tool to be used in jurisprudence and political science.
The Kanger-Lindahl theory of normative positions was applied to problems in
computer science in the 90s, see Jones & Sergot (1993) and (1996), Sergot (1999)
and (2001), Krogh (1995) and Krogh & Herrestad (1999).
6.3 Normative systems as msic-systems
Conceiving of normative systems as msic-systems is a kind of representation of
normative systems. What characterizes the subclass of normative systems among
msic-systems in general are their cognitive features. A normative system con-
sists of one stratum of descriptive grounds and another stratum of normative
consequences and eventually one or more strata of intermediaries. Furthermore,
a normative system contains links or joinings between the strata. Note that the
nal consequences are expressed in terms of normative conditions, for example
constructed by applying deontic operations to descriptive conditions. Thus, rep-
resenting normative systems in this way puts the emphasis on concepts and not
on propositions.
7 The algebraic approach to msic-systems
The study of the structure of msic-systems, especially the implicative closeness
between di¤erent strata, is one of the main goals of a series of papers co-authored
together with Lars Lindahl (see References for details).16 As tools for this en-
deavour, algebraic concepts and theories are used. In this section, two of the
structures that play a crucial role as such tools will be described briey. But
rst a preliminary remark.
7.1 Set-theoretical predicates
A common way of characterizing formal theories in mathematics is described by
Suppes as follows:
16 See especially Lindahl & Odelstad (2003), (2004), (2008a) and (2008b). Technical
results in our papers include a characterization of an msic-system in terms of the
most narrow joinings between di¤erent strata, characterization of the structure of
the most narrow joinings between two strata, conditions for the extendability of
intermediate concepts, and nally, a specication of the conditions such that the
Boolean operations on intermediate concepts will result in intermediate concepts and
characterization of most narrow joinings in terms of weakest grounds and strongest
consequences.
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The kernel of the procedure for axiomatizing theories within set theory
may be described very briey: to axiomatize a theory is to dene a
predicate in terms of notions of set theory. A predicate so dened is
called a set-theoretical predicate. (Suppes, 1957, p. 249.)
A simple example of a set-theoretical predicate is to be a quasi-ordering:
Denition 1. Let A be a set and R a binary relation on A. The relational
structure hA;Ri is a quasi-ordering if for all a; b; c in A, the following axioms
are satised:
(1) aRa (reexivity)
(2) If aRb and bRc, then aRc (transitivity).
To be a quasi-ordering is a predicate, which is true or false of relational
structures. This set-theoretical predicate characterizes an axiomatized theory,
the theory of quasi-orderings, and a model of that theory is a structure satisfying
the predicate to be a quasi-ordering.
Two set-theoretical predicates which play a crucial role in the msic-theory
will now be presented.
7.2 Boolean quasi-orderings and joining systems
Denition 2. The relational structure hB;^;0 ; Ri is a Boolean quasi-ordering
(Bqo) if hB;^;0 i is a Boolean algebra, R is a quasi-ordering, ? is the zero
element, > is the unit element and R satises the additional requirements:
(1) aRb and aRc implies aR(b ^ c);
(2) aRb implies b0Ra0,
(3) (a ^ b)Ra,
(4) not >R?:
Boolean algebras are well-known structures with many applications. A Boolean
quasi-ordering is a quasi-ordering dened on a Boolean algebra in such a way
that it determines a new Boolean algebra related to the rst one in a special way.
This is explained in more detail in Lindahl & Odelstad (2004). The denition of
a Boolean joining system, which follows below, presupposes the denition of a
Boolean quasi-ordering. Many normative systems can be represented as Boolean
joining systems or combinations of two or more such systems. First a reminder
of a notion discussed earlier:
Denition 3. The narrowness-relation determined by the quasi-orderings hB1; R1i
and hB2; R2i is the binary relation E on B1 B2 such that ha1; a2i E hb1; b2i if
and only if b1R1a1 and a2R2b2:
Note that E is a quasi-ordering on B1 B2.
Denition 4. A Boolean joining system (Bjs) is an ordered triple hB1;B2; Ji
such that B1 = hB1;^;0 ; R1i and B2 = hB2;^;0 ; R2i are Bqos and J  B1B2,
and the following requirements are satised:
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(1) for all b1; c1 2 B1 and b2; c2 2 B2; hb1; b2i 2 J and hb1; b2i E hc1; c2i implies
hc1; c2i 2 J;
(2) for any C1  B1 and b2 2 B2; if hc1; b2i 2 J for all c1 2 C1; then ha1; b2i 2 J
for all a1 2 lubR1C1;
(3) for any C2  B2 and b1 2 B1; if hb1; c2i 2 J for all c2 2 C2; then hb1; a2i 2 J
for all a2 2 glbR2C2:
A norm can, as has been pointed out above, in many contexts be regarded
as consisting of two objects, a ground condition and a consequence condition
standing in an implicative relation to each other. The ground belongs to one
Boolean quasi-ordering and the consequence to another. Therefore, we can view
a normative system as a set of joinings of a Boolean quasi-ordering of grounds to
a Boolean quasi-ordering of consequences, where ^ and 0 are Boolean operations
on the conditions. A normative system N can therefore be represented as a
Boolean joining system hB1;B2; Ji where B1 = hB1;^;0 ; R1i is a Boolean quasi-
ordering of ground-conditions, B2 = hB2;^;0 ; R2i a Boolean quasi-ordering of
consequence-conditions and the set J; where J  B1  B2, is the set of norms.
Note that the implicative relation in the system N is represented in the di¤erent
parts of the system by the relations R1, R2 and J respectively.
It is worth noting that there is a di¤erence in notational conventions between
the denition of a Bqo and the denition of a Bjs. In a Bqo, if the relation R
holds between a and b this is written aRb. If in a Bjs J holds between a1 and a2
this is written ha1; a2i 2 J . The reason is that in the intended models of Bjss,
the elements in J are treated as objects in a way that does not hold for the
elements in R. In a representation of a Bjs as a normative system, ha1; a2i 2 J
means that the norm ha1; a2i holds in the system, and the elements in J are
subject to comparison with respect to, for example, narrowness.
Given the narrowness relation E one can determine the set of minimal ele-
ments of J , min J , with respect to E. Under fairly general conditions, the set
min J characterizes J in the following way:
ha1; a2i 2 J i¤ 9 hb1; b2i 2 min J : hb1; b2i E ha1; a2i .
Given certain general presuppositions, one can choose a subset C of min J from
which min J can be inferred and which therefore also determines J . We call such
a set C a base of minimal elements of J . In many contexts, the elements in C can
be represented by intermediate concepts. An intermediary is determined by the
condition that constitute its maximally narrow ground and the condition that
constitutes its maximally narrow consequence. See Lindahl & Odelstad (2008a)
and (2008b) for further details.
7.3 Models and variations of the algebraic theories
As has been emphasized in earlier sections with normative systems as a key
example, one approach to the representation of msic-systems is by regarding
concepts as conditions subject to Boolean operations and with an implicative
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relation dened on these conditions. A Bqo or a Bjs with domains of conditions
is called a condition implication structure, abbreviated cis. A special kind of cis-
representation of a normative system is the npcis-representation of normative
conditions. In an npcis, a normative condition is constructed by applying the
one-agent position-operators to descriptive conditions (see Lindahl & Odelstad,
2004).
There are some limitations of the cis-representation of msic. One problem is
the formation of conjunctions and disjunctions of conditions of di¤erent arity.
How this can be handled is discussed in Lindahl & Odelstad (2004) section 3.
Another weakness of the cis-representation is that new conditions can only be
constructed out of given conditions by Boolean operations. As a consequence,
it is, for example, not possible to dene within a cis the condition to be the
grandfather of in terms of the conditions to be the father ofand to be the
mother of. Note that if we want grandfatherto be a condition in our cis we
can of course include it as a primitive condition.
With reference to the limitations mentioned above, it might be held that the
cis-representation is too simple to be suitable for an overall representation of an
actual legal system or a complex msic-systems of some other kind. Nevertheless,
the cis-representation is su¢ ciently rich to permit a detailed study of a number
of issues pertaining especially to intermediate concepts in a legal system.17 The
cis-representation can in a sense be viewed as an idealized modelfor studying
di¤erent phenomena in msic-systems. When judging the usefulness of the cis-
representation it is worth noting the following: Even if there are a number of
di¢ culties when it comes to a detailed representation of norms as joinings in a
Boolean joining system, it may be the case that these di¢ culties do not appear
when the objective in view is rather to construct an articial normative system
regulating an articial multiagent-system.
Condition implication structures are not the only kind of models of Boolean
joining systems that are interesting as representations of msic-systems. It is easy
to see that we can construct a Bqo out of a rst order theory . Consider the
structure hB;^;0 ; Ri where hB;^;0 i is the Lindenbaum algebra of the predi-
cate calculus. Let R be the quasi-ordering on B determined by the Lindenbaum
algebra of : Then hB;^;0 ; Ri is a Boolean quasi-ordering.
Boolean joining systems are obviously based on the notion of a Boolean
algebra. However, it is possible to dene an analogous kind of systems based
on lattices. Such a system hL1;L2; Ji consists of the latticed quasi-orderings
L1 = hL1;^;_; R1i and L2 = hL2;^;_; R2i and the set J of joinings between
them and can be called a latticed joining system, abbreviated Ljs. A large fraction
of the formal result proved for Bjss will hold also for Ljss, roughly because the
complement operation in the Boolean algebras does not play a role in the proofs.
There are models of the theory of Ljs that can be interesting representations of
msic-systems. This holds, for example, when the concepts in the msic-systems
17 Cf. Lindahl & Odelstad (2006b), where it is suggested that a representation based
on cylindric algebras would be more appropriate than a representation based on
Boolean algebras.
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are not conditions but instead for instance aspects or equality relations for as-
pects.
7.4 The formal representation of msic-systems
The formal theory of msic-systems is to a large extent a question of represen-
tation. The algebraic framework for the representation of msic-systems in the
work that Lindahl and I have conducted has gone through di¤erent stagesand
I will outline and discuss these stages here.
Stage 1: Lattice-representation In Lindahl & Odelstad (1996) and (1999a),
an msic-system is represented as a lattice hL;i of conditions extended with a
quasi-ordering . The lattice operations represent conjunction and disjunction
respectively. Negation is not included for purely pragmatic reasons; in the rst
version of the theory we preferred to simplify the matter but still be able to
express our main ideas about intermediaries. The partial ordering  in the lattice
represents logical implicationand the quasi-ordering  represent implications
in a more general sense. The relation between the partial ordering  and the
quasi-ordering  is such that the partial ordering  generated from  by the
formation of equivalence classes is a lattice and  is a subset of . hL;i
is the quotient algebra of hL;i with the respect to the indi¤erence part of
. A two-sorted conceptual system is represented as a system of two sublattices
hL1;1i and hL2;2i of hL;i and the set fhx1; x2i 2 L1  L2 j x1  x2g of
joinings between the sublattices.
Stage 2: Bqo-representation In Odelstad & Lindahl (1998), the formal
framework for representing msic-systems is modied in some respects:
(1) We incorporate the operation of negation and suppose that the conditions
constitute a Boolean algebra hB;^;0 i.
(2) We do not make a transition to the quotient algebra of hB;^;0 i with respect
to the indi¤erence part of . Instead we construct the Boolean quasi-ordering
hB;^;0 ; i. The reason is that we want to distinguish between two conditions
even if they are indi¤erent with respect to . See Lindahl & Odelstad (2004)
section 2.1.
(3) We make a clearer separation between the algebraic theories and the models
used for the representation of msic-systems. In stage 1, we regarded the lattice
operations ^ and _ as representing conjunction and disjunction of conditions,
since we only had one intended model in view. A Bqo of conditions is one kind
of Bqo-model which can be used for representing msic-systems and we do not
exclude the possibility that there can be other kinds of models.
Note that an msic-system is represented as a system of substructures of
hB;^;0 ; i, called fragments, and the set of joinings between them. The for-
mal tools for the representation of msic-systems based on the Bqo-theory is
further developed in Odelstad & Lindahl (2000), Lindahl and Odelstad (2000)
and (2004). This Bqo-representation is used in Odelstad & Boman (2004) and
Lindahl & Odelstad (2003).
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Stage 3: Bjs-representation In the Bqo-representation ofmsic-systems, strata
of concepts of di¤erent sorts are represented as fragments of the basic Bqo
hB;^;0 ; i. Hence, B contains conditions of di¤erent sorts. But B contains also
Boolean combinations of concepts of di¤erent sorts, i.e. compound concepts of a
mixed sort. In many contexts, however, concepts of such mixed sorts are not
of any interest and make the situation unnecessarily complicated. To avoid this
complication, a Bjs can be a useful tool for representations. A two-sorted con-
ceptual system is then represented as a Bjs hB1;B2; Ji consisting of two Bqos
B1 and B2 together with the set of joinings J between them. The Bqos B1 and
B2 are not necessarily fragments of one Bqo. The axioms of a Bjs are such that
two fragments of a Bqo and the joinings between them constitute a Bjs.
However, if one wants to study msic-systems containing conditions of several
di¤erent sorts, this would involve a number of Bjss related to each other in
a complicated way. It may then be useful to have as a background a Boolean
algebra hB;^;0 i representing the language of the msic-system and a binary
relation  representing the non-logical (for example normative) content of the
system. The sets of joinings between di¤erent strata of concepts will then be
contained in . A msic-system may therefore appropriately be represented as
a supplemented Boolean algebra, abbreviated sBa, hB;^;0 ; i with Bjss lying
within it. This is the approach in Lindahl & Odelstad (2008a) and (2008b).
7.5 Non-Boolean joining systems
In this section, two examples of joining systems consisting of concepts but not
constituting Bjs will be outlined briey.
Joining systems of equality-relations In this essay I have focused on msic-
systems where the concepts are conditions subject to the Boolean operations.
But there are kinds of conditions that do not constitute Boolean algebras. One
example is equality-relations. The term equality-relationhere refer to a relation
of equality with respect to some aspect , and it is presupposed in this context
that an equality-relation is always an equivalence-relation, i.e. a reexive, tran-
sitive and symmetric relation. Let A be a non-empty set and let E (A) be the
set of equivalence relations on A. Dene the binary relation  on E (A) in the
following way: For all "1; "2 2 E (A)
"1  "2 i¤ x"1y implies x"2y: (1)
The reader should be reminded of the following well-known fact. E (A) =
hE (A) ;i is a complete lattice. Note that the negation "0 of an equivalence
relation " 2 E (A) is not an equivalence relation, i.e. "0 =2 E (A). Let E1 =
hE1;1i and E2 = hE2;2i be disjoint complete sublattices of E (A) and con-
sider hE1; E2; Ji where J = = (E1 (A) E2 (A)). Given some general conditions
hE1; E2; Ji is a joining system. We have here an example of a joining system
which consists of conditions but they do not constitute a Boolean algebra.
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A Boolean quasi-ordering is a Boolean algebra extended with a quasi-ordering
satisfying certain conditions. We can dene an analogous structure based on
a lattice instead of a Boolean algebra. Let E (A) and  be as above and let
hE (A) ;^;_i be the lattice hE (A) ;i expressed in terms of operations instead
of a partial ordering, i.e. "1^"2 = inf f"1; "2g and "1_"2 = sup f"1; "2g. Suppose
that R is a quasi-ordering on E (A) such that
(1) aRb and aRc implies aR(b ^ c).
(2) aRc and bRc implies (a _ b)Rc.
(3) (a ^ b)Ra.
(4) aR(a _ b):
Then hE (A) ;^;_; Ri is called a latticed quasi-ordering. The transition to the
quotient algebra of hE (A) ;^;_i with respect to the indi¤erence part of R will re-
sult in a lattice. (Cf. Lindahl & Odelstad, 1999a, p. 171.) The msic-systems con-
sisting of equality-relations can often be represented as latticed quasi-orderings,
and this also holds for msic-systems consisting of aspects.
Joining systems of aspects As pointed out above, this essay has focused
on msic-systems where the concepts are conditions. But there are other kinds
of concepts, for example aspects, in many disciplines called attributes. As ex-
amples of aspects let me mention a few: area, temperature, age, loudness and
archeological value. It is a common view of aspects that they can, in some way
or another, be represented as relational structures. In Odelstad (1992), a theory
of aspects, where aspects are represented by systems of relationals, is set out. A
relational is a function with sets as arguments and structures as values. On sets
of systems of relationals, several quasi-orderings can be dened but here only
one example will be given.
Let RelsD denote the set of systems of relationals whose range of denition is
the family D of sets. This means that for all <2RelsD it holds that < = hiii2I
for some set I and for all A 2 D, i (A)  Ai where i is the arity of the
relational i. Hence, < (A)=hA; iii2I . Let = (< (A) ;< (B)) denote the set of
isomorphisms from < (A) to < (B). We can dene a relation sub on RelsD in
the following way: If <1;<22RelsD then
<2 sub <1 i¤ for all A;B 2 D : = (<2 (A) ;<2 (B))  = (<1 (A) ;<1 (B)) : (2)
It is obvious that sub is a quasi-ordering on RelsD. It follows from Odelstad
(1992) that hRelsD; subi is a complete quasi-lattice and it is therefore possi-
ble that there are joining systems lying within hRelsD; subi.18 The relational
18 If hA;Ri is a quasi-ordering such that lubR fa; bg 6= ? and glbR fa; bg 6= ? for all
a; b 2 A, then hA;Ri will be called a quasi-lattice. If lubRX 6= ? and glbRX 6= ?
for all X  A, then a quasi-ordering hA;Ri is a complete quasi-lattice.
Suppose that hA;Ri is a quasi-lattice, Q the equality-part of R and AQ is the set
of Q-equivalence classes generated by elements of A. Then hAQ; i, where [a]Q  [b]Q
i¤ aRb, is a lattice. If hA;Ri is a complete quasi-lattice then hAQ; i is a complete
lattice.
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systems in hRelsD; subi can be of di¤erent sorts and it is a meaningful ques-
tion if they form joining systems or even latticed joining systems. Note that in
hRelsD; subi the implicative relation sub is not implication in the usual sense
but expresses a kind of dependence relation.
7.6 A remark on input-output logic
In a series of papers, Makinson and van der Torre have developed a highly
interesting theory called input-output logic, see for example Makinson and van
der Torre (2000) and (2003). One striking similarity between input-output logic
and the theory of msic-systems is that norms are represented as ordered pairs.
This observation raises the question if there are some deep similarities between
input-output logic and msic-theory. However, let me rst state some obvious
di¤erences between the two theories. While msic-systems are by denition at
least two-sorted, this does not holds for input-output logic. A common feature
of the study of msic-systems reported here is the implicative closeness between
strata of di¤erent sorts in an msic-system. An analogous study does not seem
to have been carried out for input-output logic. The strata of an msic-system of
conditions are Boolean structures (Bqos to be more precise), but the strata of
msic-systems of other kinds need not be Boolean structures; instead, they can
for example be lattice-like structures. In input-output logic, the set of inputs
constitute a Boolean algebra and the same holds for the set of outputs.
The following remark sheds some light on the relation between input-output
logic and the theory of msic-systems. (Knowledge of input-output logic is pre-
supposed.) Suppose that hB1;B2; Ji is a Bjs where B1 = hB1;^;0 ; R1i and
B2 = hB2;^;0 ; R2i. Makinson and van der Torre state a number of rules for
the output operators they dene. Translated to a Bjs these rules are as follows:
Strengthening Input: From ha1; a2i 2 J to hb1; a2i 2 J whenever b1R1a2.
Follows from condition (1) of a Bjs.
Conjoining Input: From ha1; a2i 2 J and ha1; b2i 2 J to ha1; a2 ^ b2i 2 J .
Follows from condition (3) of a Bjs.
Weakening Output: From ha1; a2i 2 J to ha1; b2i 2 J whenever a2R2b2.
Follows from condition (1) of a Bjs.
Disjoining Input: From ha1; a2i 2 J and hb1; a2i 2 J to ha1 _ b1; a2i 2 J .
Follows from condition (2) of a Bjs.
There are three conditions on a joining space in a Boolean joining system.
The comparison with input-output logic above shows that it could be of interest
to dene weaker kinds of systems characterized by, for example, condition (1)
and (3).
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8 Applications of msic-systems in agent theory
8.1 Introduction
The applications of the theory of msic-systems in computer science can follow
di¤erent paths. One path goes through the representation of normative systems
as msic-systems and the applications of normative systems in computer science.
Along a related path, the focus is on intermediate concepts, which are important
in normative systems but also in other kinds of systems, for example in knowledge
representation systems. A third path is the use of conceptual structures in elds
like the Semantic Web and information extraction. Here a few comments on the
use of msic-systems in the theory of articial agents will be made, where the
msic-systems will mainly represent normative systems.
8.2 Agent oeconomicus norma
Within economic theory the consumers behaviour has traditionally been de-
scribed as determined by a utility function. During the last three decades there
has been a growing interest among researchers in how norms (for example rules
of law) pose restrictions on the behaviour induced by the utility function. The
behaviour of the consumers or other economic agents, according to this model,
is the result of the interplay between optimization of the utility function and
restrictions due to norms. We may perhaps speak of norm-regulated Homo oe-
conomicus. It has also been suggested that a model of this kind could be used
for regulating the behaviour of articial agents. We can perhaps call this model
Agent oeconomicus norma. The role that norms will have in regulating the be-
havior of agents is, according to this model, to delimit the autonomy of the
agents. Metaphorically one can say that the norms dene the scope (Spielraum)
for an agent. The agent chooses the act it likes best within the scope determined
by the norms.
Norm-regulation of agents presupposes a precise and signicant representa-
tion of norms and normative systems. As was explained in previous sections, a
norm is here represented as an implicative sentence where the antecedent is a
descriptive condition stating the circumstances of an agent, and the consequent
is a condition expressing the normative or deontic position that the agent has
with respect to a state of a¤airs. Hence, from the norms of the system will follow
a deontic structure over possible state of a¤airs implying that some states may
be permissible while the rest are non-permissible. The wishor desireof an
agent is represented as a preference structure over possible states or situations.
The agent chooses an act which leads to one of the permissible states that it
prefers the most.
In Odelstad & Boman (2004), the ideas outlined above were developed using
the typology of normative (deontic) positions developed by Kanger and Lindahl
and the algebraic representation of normative systems that Lindahl and I have
developed. The aim of Odelstad & Boman (2004) was to present a model of
how norms can be used to regulate the behaviour of multiagent-systems on the
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assumption that the role of norms is to dene the Spielraum for an agent.19 An
abstract architecture was dened in terms of a set-theoretical predicates and a
Mas (a multiagent-system) having this architecture is called a norm-regulated
Dalmas.20 One of the results in Odelstad & Boman (2004) was a scheme for how
normative positions will restrict the set of actions that the agents are permitted
to choose from.
8.3 Normative positions regulating actions
A Dalmas is an ordered 7-tuple h
;S;A;A;;;   i containing
 an agent set 
 (!;{; !1; ::: elements in 
),
 a state or phase space S (r; s; s1; ::: elements in S),
 an action set A such that for all a 2 A, a : 
  S ! S such that a(!; r) = s
means that if the agent ! performs the act a in state r, then the result will
be state s (a; b; a1; ::: elements in A),
 a function A : 
  S ! }(A) where }(A) is the power set of A; A(!; s) is
the set of acts accessible (feasible) for agent ! in state s,
 a deontic structure-operator  : 
  S ! D where D is a set of deontic
structures of the same type with subsets of A as domains and (!; s) is !s
deontic structure on A(!; s) in state s,
 a preference structure-operator  : 
S ! P where P is a set of preference
structures of the same type with subsets of A as domains and (!; s) is !s
preference structure on A(!; s) in state s,
 a choice-set function   : 
  S ! }(A) where   (!; s) is the set of actions
for ! to choose from in state s.
Note that in the denition the Cartesian product 
S motivates the intro-
duction of a name for the elements in 
  S: Let D be a Dalmas. A situation
for the system D is determined by the agent to move ! and the state s. A situ-
ation is represented by an ordered pair h!; si. The set of situations for D is thus

  S:
The idea behind a norm-regulated Dalmas is roughly the following: What is
permissible for an agent to do in a situation h!; si is determined by a normative
system N . This idea can be explicated in the following way. Let
Tid(!1; :::; ! ; !;!; s) (3)
mean that in the situation where it is the agent !s turn to draw and the state
of the system is s, ! has the normative position of type Ti with regard to the
state of a¤airs d(!1; :::; !).
Prohibited!;s(a) means that in the situation where it is !s turn to draw and
the state of the system is s, ! is prohibited to execute the act a.
19 For the use of the term Spielraumin this context, see Lindahl (1977) and Lindahl
(2005).
20 The term Dalmas is chosen since the architecture is constructed for the application
of deontic-action logic.
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The following seven principles establish connections between the condition
Tid and the predicate Prohibited (see Odelstad & Boman, 2004, p. 160f.):
1. From T1d(!1; :::; ! ; !;!; s) follows no restriction on the acts.
2. From T2d(!1; :::; ! ; !;!; s) follows that
if d(!1; :::; ! ; s) and :d(!1; :::; ! ; a(!; s)) then Prohibited!;s(a):
3. From T3d(!1; :::; !!;!; s) follows that
if [d(!1; :::; ! ; s) i¤ d(!1; :::; ! ; a(!; s))] then Prohibited!;s(a):
4. From T4d(!1; :::; ! ; !;!; s) follows that
if :d(!1; :::; ! ; s) and d(!1; :::; ! ; a(!; s)) then Prohibited!;s(a):
5. From T5d(!1; :::; ! ; !;!; s) follows that
if :d(!1; :::; ! ; a(!; s)) then Prohibited!;s(a):
6. From T6d(!1; :::; ! ; !;!; s) follows that
if not [d(!1; :::; ! ; s) i¤ d(!1; :::; ! ; a(!; s)] then Prohibited!;s(a):
7. From T7d(!1; :::; ! ; !;!; s) follows that
if d(!1; :::; ! ; a(!; s)) then Prohibited!;s(a):
These principles can be used to dene a deontic structure-operator  such
that to each agent ! in a state s is assigned the set of feasible acts a that are
not eliminated as Prohibited!;s(a) according to the rules (1)-(7) above. Since
Prohibited!;s(a) is equivalent to :Permissible!;s(a).
it follows that
(!; s) = fPermissible!;s(a) : a 2 Ag:
Note that at the outset, all feasible acts are permissible. The basic idea is
that we eliminate elements from the set of permissible acts for ! in s using
the norms and sentences expressing what holds for the agents with respect to
grounds in the norms.
The method used for representing norms in an architecture for norm-regulated
Mas can be of importance for the e¤ectiveness of the architecture. Here a few ex-
amples of what can be regarded as desiderata for a norm-representation method
are mentioned.
1. The system of norms is depicted in a lucid, concise and e¤ective way.
2. Changes and extensions of the normative system are easily described.
3. The normative system can be divided in di¤erent parts which can be changed
independently.
4. The multi-agent system can by itself change the normative system wholly or
partially.
The last item in the list may deserve a comment. It is often di¢ cult to predict
the e¤ect of a normative system for a Mas or the e¤ect of a change of norms.
It is therefore desirable that the Mas can by itself evaluate the e¤ect of the
normative system and compare the result with other normative systems that it
changes to. The result can be a kind of evolution of normative systems obtained
by machine learning.
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In Odelstad & Boman (2004), the npcis-model was used for representing
normative systems, which resulted in an opportunity to test some aspects of this
kind of representation in the area of multiagent-systems.
8.4 Prolog implementation of norm-regulated DALMAS
In Hjelmblom (2008), an implementation in Prolog of the theory of a norm-
regulatedDalmas is presented. The algebraic theory is instrumentalized through
an executable logic program. Important issues in the transition from a set-
theoretical description to a Prolog implementation are discussed. Results include
a general-level Prolog implementation, which may be freely used to implement
specic systems.
The Prolog implementation gives a procedural semantics to the algebraic
theory, see Lloyd (1987). Running the Prolog program has not only pedagog-
ical value, but can aid understanding of the implications of changing parts of
the underlying theory. The fact that the Prolog program runs without notably
long response time also testies, albeit informally, to the acceptable compu-
tational complexity of the canonical model. Any domain-specic model created
with Hjelmbloms Prolog implementation can have its computational complexity
analysed more formally through algorithmic analysis if necessary (see Purdom
Jr. & Brown, 1985).
8.5 Norms and forest cleaning
Forest management treatments presuppose, in a state of incomplete information,
principles for choosing those trees that ought to be taken away and those that
shall be left standing. In this section, which is a report on a work in progress
carried out in cooperation with Ulla Ahonen-Jonnarth, the question is raised
whether those principles can be structured as a combination of a normative
system and a utility function. Of special interest is the possibility to evaluate
the e¢ ciency of the normative system and the utility function and, furthermore,
suggest improvements of them.21
In the forest industry there is an increasing interest in the automation of
forest management treatments, perhaps with the ultimate goal that autonomous
robots will be able to do a substantial part of such work. But before robots of this
kind can be constructed many di¢ cult problems must be solved, for example how
the robots will perceive the environment and how they will transport themselves.
But there are also decision-making problems involved. Three important kinds of
forest management treatments are cleaning, thinning and harvesting, and they
all require methods or principles for making decisions about which trees shall
be removed and which will be left standing. Such remove-decisionsmust be
made on-line with information based only on the robots nearest vicinity and
about that part of the stand already cleared. The treatment cannot be evaluated
21 This section is based on Ahonen-Jonnarth & Odelstad (2005), Ahonen-Jonnarth &
Odelstad (2006) and Odelstad (2007).
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until the actual stand is completely cleared. Testing and evaluating principles
for remove-decisions by eld experiments is expensive and time-consuming. It is
therefore an interesting question wether evaluating experiments could be made
in silico, i.e. through simulation.
In Ahonen-Jonnarth & Odelstad (2005), a platform for simulation of young
forest stands is presented. Given eld data of a special type of young forest, for
example a 10-year-old, somewhat damp, spruce forest at 200 meters above sea
level in the middle of Sweden, it is possible to simulate di¤erent stands of this
type of forest. Field data of a few di¤erent types of young forests has so far been
used for simulation. As a base for the simulation of di¤erent stands of the same
forest type, it is of course also possible to use man-made, articial data, or to
assign values to the parameters that govern the simulation.
One of the goals of our present work on automation of forest cleaning is to
formulate di¤erent principles for making the remove-decisions, test the principles
in simulated forests of di¤erent types and evaluate and compare the results. We
are especially interested in the possibility that, given a method for evaluating
the result of cleaning, the system can improve the decision-making principles
and even suggest new ones on the basis of machine learning. How the principles
for the remove-decisions ought to be formally represented seems to be a compli-
cated question. One possibility we want to investigate is to use norm-regulated
Dalmas as the architecture for a cleaning agent. At this preliminary stage, a
cleaning agent is regarded as a solitary beingand, hence, a cleaning Dalmas
is a one-agent-system (thus more correctly a Daloas), but we will here regard
a one-agent-system as a degenerated MAS. But at a later stage, more then one
agent may be involved, for example can naturebe regarded as an agent or can
individual trees be regarded as agents. The last mentioned alternative is espe-
cially interesting if the growth of a forest stand is incorporated in the simulation.
A Dalmas can achieve the cleaning-decisions for a stand p in the following
way. The stand is divided into n di¤erent areas. A state for the system is the
stand with i areas cleaned, where 1  i  n, and a specication of what area to
clean next. The initial state is the stand with 0 areas cleaned and the nal state
is the state with n areas cleaned. Let each area be denoted by a unique number
between 1 and n, and let Si be the ith state. Ci denotes the set of cleaned areas
and Ui the set of uncleaned areas in Si. Thus, Ci[Ui = f1; 2; : : : ; ng and Ci\Ui =
;. Ci contains i numbers and Ui contains n i numbers. Si = hCi; Ui; ji where j is
the area which will be cleaned next, i.e. j 2 Ui and Si+1 = hCi [ fjg; Uinfjg; ki
for some k 2 Uinfjg.
A few examples of possible norms regulating a cleaning Dalmas are given
below:
(a) If there is only one undamaged tree in the area to be cleaned with a diameter
within the desirable range, then this tree shall be saved.
(b) If there is at least one undamaged tree in the area to be cleaned with a
diameter within the desirable range, then a damaged tree with a diameter
below the desirable range may be taken away.
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(c) If, in the area to be cleaned, a tree t is damaged and is closer than 0.5m
to an undamaged tree with a diameter within the desirable range and with
distances to other undamaged trees larger than 0.5m, then t may not be
saved.
In many situations, the norms of a Dalmas do not determine the action
to be taken in each state, but utility considerations are also necessary. Given a
utility function we can search for the optimal way of cleaning the actual area,
on the assumption that the cleaning satises the given norms.
For the possibility of using norms in the automation of forest cleaning in
the way outlined above, it may be an important issue whether the cleaning sys-
tem can optimize the system of norms regulating its remove-decisions. This is
a special case of a more general problem: Suppose that D is a Dalmas, where
the agents cooperate to solve a problem. Which normative system will lead to
the most e¤ective behavior of the system? It is desirable that D itself could
determine the optimal normative system for the task in question. Given a set of
grounds and a set of consequences, which together constitute the vocabulary of
the system, D can test all possible sets of minimal norms (in many cases satisfy-
ing certain constraints, for example represented by intermediaries). If there is a
function for evaluating the result of a run of D, then di¤erent normative systems
can be compared and the best system can be chosen. A change of vocabulary
corresponds to a mutationamong normative systems and can lead to dramatic
changes in the e¤ectiveness. Note that, in principle, the evaluation function can
be very complicated, for example it can be multi-dimensional.
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